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The United States boasts a bigger entertainment industry than 
any other country,1 with Los Angeles regarded as the entertain-
ment capital of the world.2 Accounts differ as to the explanation for 
California’s rise to entertainment prominence. One version 
attributes the flocking to the west coast as a product of Cecil B. 
DeMille’s last-minute location change for The Squaw Man in 1914 
to Los Angeles; but, by 1910, movies had already been filmed in the 
area.3 Another explanation focuses on Thomas Edison, who oper-
ated in New York and New Jersey, and exerted a significant 
amount of control over the industry in its early days because he 
held many patents on the technologies necessary to make movies.4 
Edison created the Motion Picture Patent Company (“MPPC”), 
which essentially established a monopoly on all aspects of filmmak-
ing by limiting the sale of necessary items to its members.5 Produc-
ers who did not join the MPPC and pay the associated fees in order 
to use the technologies would likely be sued for using Edison’s 
                                                                                                                            
1 The Media & Entertainment Industry in the United States, SELECTUSA, 
http://selectusa.commerce.gov/industry-snapshots/media-entertainment-industry-
united-states [http://perma.cc/DMZ9-6ZLE] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015) (noting that the 
United States’ media and entertainment industry comprised of “businesses that produce 
and distribute motion pictures, television programs and commercials, along with music 
and audio recordings, radio, games, and publishing.”). 
2 L.A. CTY. ECON. DEV. CORP., THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY AND THE LOS 
ANGELES COUNTY ECONOMY 1 (Nov. 2012), http://laedc.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/ 
04/EntertainmentinLA.pdf [http://perma.cc/DL69-A87S]. 
3 See The History of the Hollywood Movie Industry, HISTORY COOPERATIVE (Nov. 12, 2014), 
http://historycooperative.org/the-history-of-the-hollywood-movie-industry [http://perma.cc/ 
GS32-494H] [hereinafter History of Hollywood]. 
4 See Dan Lewis, Thomas Edison Drove the Film Industry to California, MENTAL FLOSS 
(July 16, 2013, 5:00 PM), http://mentalfloss.com/article/51722/thomas-edison-drove-
film-industry-california [http://perma.cc/P58F-YES2]. 
5 See id. 
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technologies.6 Thus, many early filmmakers decided to leave the 
east coast for California, where judges were less sympathetic to 
Edison and the power of his patents.7 Regardless of the historical 
explanation, cinema in America took off in popularity, establishing 
“Hollywood,” the neighborhood where movie studios had set up 
shop, as synonymous with the industry itself.8 
Coincidentally, the birth of the music industry is also owed in 
part to Edison; his discovery of the phonograph in late 1877 began 
the cultural phenomenon of recorded music that continues today.9 
Unlike the film industry’s Hollywood, no single region became the 
home of American music, as many major cities had at least one 
phonograph company to make recordings and many nickelodeons, 
establishments at which a person could listen to music for a nickel 
per song.10 Still, despite the prevalence of popular music genres in 
many American cities,11 the “Big Three,”—Sony Music Group 
(“Sony”), Universal Music Group (“UMG”), and Warner Music 
Group (“WMG”)—represent a large share of the music market;12 
many well-known, though seemingly smaller, regional record labels 
actually fall under the corporate umbrella of one of these three 
players.13 Of these, UMG’s headquarters is located in California,14 
                                                                                                                            
6 See id. 
7 See id. 
8 See History of Hollywood, supra note 3. 
9 Thomas Edison and the First Phonograph, AMERICA’S LIBRARY, 
http://www.americaslibrary.gov/jb/recon/jb_recon_phongrph_1.html 
[http://perma.cc/AK2K-LZYR] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015). 
10 See Alex Cosper, History of Record Labels and the Music Industry, PLAYLIST 
RESEARCH, http://www.playlistresearch.com/recordindustry.htm [http://perma.cc/ 
F9Q4-YD53] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015). 
11 For example, we often associate Nashville as the center of country music, Detroit as 
the birthplace of Motown, and Seattle as the home to “grunge” rock, to name a few 
American regions tied to popular music genres. See Richard Florida, The Geography of 
America’s Music Scenes, CITYLAB (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.citylab.com/design/2012/ 
08/geography-americas-music-scenes/2709 [http://perma.cc/6E7B-RWGW]. 
12 As of mid-2014, the Big Three controlled eighty-nine percent of global music sales. 
See Matt Pollock, Three Huge Record Labels Are Preparing to Take a Lot of Money From 
Their Artists, MIC (July 17, 2014), http://mic.com/articles/93502/three-huge-record-
labels-are-preparing-to-take-a-lot-of-money-from-their-artists [http://perma.cc/CUK7-
AA92]. 
13 For a complete listing of each of these brands’ subsidiary labels, visit their websites: 
Labels, SONY MUSIC GROUP, http://www.sonymusic.com/labels [http://perma.cc/ 
9UZF-ETZU] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015); Our Labels & Brands, UNIVERSAL MUSIC 
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and Sony and WMG are both headquartered in New York.15 Thus, 
most recording contracts by major labels are signed in, or otherwise 
made subject to, the laws of California or New York.16 
This Note focuses on the effects of a provision in section 2855 
of the California Labor Code. The history of this statute is impor-
tant to understand the impact the statute has had on the entertain-
ment industry, but more specifically, the music industry. Section 
2855(a) limits the length of time personal service employment con-
tracts may be enforced to a period of seven years, which is why the 
entire statute is often referred to as the “Seven Year Rule.”17 It 
states that a contract for personal service of a “special, unique, un-
usual, extraordinary, or intellectual character,” like those in the 
entertainment industry, “cannot be enforced against the employee 
beyond the term of seven years from the commencement of service 
under it.”18 
Initially enacted in 1872 as section 1980 of the California Civil 
Code, the law originally prohibited employers from enforcing con-
                                                                                                                            
GROUP, http://www.universalmusic.com/labels [http://perma.cc/V4NV-NHPT] (last 
visited Dec. 17, 2015); Services, WARNER MUSIC GROUP, http://www.wmg.com/ 
services#artists-services [http://perma.cc/HC9L-VT9U] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015). 
14 Universal Music Group’s corporate headquarters is located in Santa Monica, 
California. See Contact Us, UNIVERSAL MUSIC GROUP, http://www.universalmusic.com/ 
contact-us [http://perma.cc/5XH2-FMES] (last visited Dec. 17, 2015). 
15 Sony Music Group’s headquarters is located in New York, New York, see FAQ, 
SONY MUSIC GROUP, http://www.sonymusic.com/faq/#seven [http://perma.cc/XJ3K-
8Z6L] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015), as is Warner Music Group’s, see Culture, WARNER 
MUSIC GROUP, http://www.wmg.com/culture#contact [http://perma.cc/7ZMT-YTBX] 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2015). 
16 See M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY & SIDNEY SHEMEL, THE BUSINESS OF MUSIC: THE 
DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 5 (8th ed. 2000) (noting that even in the case 
of New York music contracts, major record labels include a “duration provision” that is 
the same in New York or California). 
17 The statute is also referred to as the “De Haviland Law” after actress Olivia de 
Havilland (those who refer to the law after Ms. de Havilland often spell her last name the 
same way as it appears in the case citation: incorrectly), who brought a suit against 
Warner Brothers to end her exclusive contract with the studio after seven years had 
lapsed. See infra Part I.A.2. 
18 CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855 (2014); see also De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 
67 Cal. App. 2d 225, 229 (1944) (holding that section 2855’s “seven year” limitation on 
personal service contracts must be measured in calendar years, not in terms of actual 
service) (emphasis added). 
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tracts of personal service after two years.19 In 1931, the statute was 
amended to increase the term to seven years.20 Finally, six years lat-
er, section 1980 was repealed and section 2855 of the Labor Code 
was enacted, which adopted and streamlined the language of the 
old provision.21 For fifty years, section 2855 did not change at all; 
even now, nearly eighty years later, the Seven Year Rule is an “ac-
cepted tenet of entertainment law,” a “given” in contract negotia-
tions.22 
In 1987, however, the California legislature amended the sta-
tute to add an additional subsection, which will be the focus of this 
Note. This music industry-specific amendment, section 2855(b), 
represents a “carve out”23 that essentially exempts musicians from 
protection under the statute.24 Part I of this Note will explain the 
legislative history of section 2855 and related lawsuits in order to 
contextualize the 1987 amendment within the entertainment indus-
try. It will also give a brief background on the nature of recording 
contracts and explore the typical structure of a deal between musi-
cians and labels. Part II will examine the conflicts between different 
areas of contract law that arise from the amendment, including the 
freedom to contract, unconscionability, unjust enrichment, and 
inequity in bargaining power between parties. Lastly, Part III will 
outline potential solutions to resolve conflicts created by the law, 
including two possible amendments to section 2855(b), and repeal-
ing section 2855(b) altogether. Ultimately, I argue that the best op-
                                                                                                                            
19 GREGG B. RAMER, KATTEN MUCHIN ROSENMAN LLP, PERSONAL SERVICE WITH A 
SMILE: A HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA’S “SEVEN-YEAR” RULE 1 (2013), 
http://www.kattenlaw.com/files/48984_Spotlight_on_Entertainment_and_Media%20L
aw_Personal_Service_With_a%20Smile_A_History_of_Californias_Seven_Year_Rule.
pdf [http://perma.cc/SLZ5-LZT5]; see also LAB. § 2855. 
20 See RAMER, supra note 19, at 1. 
21 Id. at 2. 
22 See Matthew Belloni, De Havilland Lawsuit Resonates Through Hollywood, REUTERS 
(Aug. 23, 2007, 11:10 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/08/24/industry-
lawsuit-dc-idUSN2329585820070824 [http://perma.cc/FD7Z-55KF]. 
23 See Sarah Brouillette, The False Freedom of Rock Stardom, REVIEWS IN CULTURAL 
THEORY (Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.reviewsinculture.com/ [http://perma.cc/C3AL-
97AA] (reviewing MATT STAHL, UNFREE MASTERS: POPULAR MUSIC AND THE POLITICS 
OF WORK (2012)). 
24 See infra Part II.C. 
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tion for ensuring fair outcomes is repealing section 2855(b) through 
collective action of recording artists. 
I. PERSONAL SERVICE CONTRACTS IN CALIFORNIA 
A. History of Section 2855 
1. Enactment and Early Amendments 
In 1872, the California legislature passed section 1980 of the 
Civil Code, which stated, 
A contract to render personal service, other than a 
contract of apprenticeship . . . cannot be enforced 
against the employee beyond the term of two years 
from the commencement of service under it; but if 
the employee voluntarily continues his service un-
der it beyond that time, the contract may be referred 
to as affording a presumptive measure of the com-
pensation.25 
Of course, this early version of section 2855 predates what we 
know now as Hollywood,26 however, the desire to limit a term of 
personal service is perhaps best contextualized in a post-Civil War 
America.27 Over the next several decades, the statute adapted to 
match the burgeoning entertainment industry;28 in 1931, the statute 
was amended to include the phrase “special, unique, unusual, ex-
traordinary, or intellectual” in qualifying the kind of personal ser-
                                                                                                                            
25 See RAMER, supra note 19, at 1. 
26 See Lewis, supra note 4; see also History of Hollywood, supra note 3. 
27 This point is, admittedly, only subtly alluded to in the introduction of Gregg 
Ramer’s very helpful overview of the history of section 2855. See RAMER, supra note 19, 
at 1. 
28 See History of Hollywood, supra note 3 (“The 1930’s was considered the Golden Age 
of Hollywood. A new era in film history began in this decade with the introduction of 
sound into film, creating new genres such as musicians, documentaries, social statement 
films, comedies, westerns, and horror movies.”). 
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vice contract under this law.29 Six years later, the statute was reco-
dified and reworded30 with text that has since been unchanged.31 
2. De Haviland v. Warner Brothers 
The Seven Year Rule was perhaps most famously tested in 
1944 in De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc.32 In 1936, right in 
the middle of Hollywood’s “studio system” era,33 a nineteen year-
old actress, Olivia de Havilland, signed a seven-year exclusive con-
tract with Warner Brothers Pictures.34 During this time, studios 
were highly vertically integrated, enjoyed control over production 
and distribution, and relied on long-term star contracts to bolster 
their popularity.35 By 1943, after amassing critical acclaim and con-
siderable star-power, de Havilland refused a few roles she was of-
fered by Warner Brothers in order to best serve her reputation and 
career aspirations.36 For these refusals and other issues (including 
illness) that arose throughout the course of her seven year contract, 
she was placed on several suspensions that totaled twenty-five 
weeks, which Warner Brothers attempted to tack onto the back end 
of her contract.37 
De Havilland brought suit against the studio, arguing that her 
contract could not be enforced past the seven-year mark, and the 
California Court of Appeals agreed.38 The court held that “the 
substitution of years of service for calendar years would work a 
drastic change of state policy with relation to contracts for personal 
                                                                                                                            
29 CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855 (2014). 
30 See De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 67 Cal. App. 2d 225, 230 (1944) (“It 
is clear that section 2855 of the Labor Code is a restatement and continuation of former 
Civil Code section 1980 and not a new enactment.”). 
31 See LAB. § 2855. 
32 67 Cal. App. 2d at 225. 
33 See Hollywood Studio System Collection (1913-1948), MEDIA HISTORY DIGITAL 
LIBRARY, http://mediahistoryproject.org/hollywood [http://perma.cc/2XWB-5G7U] 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2015). 
34 Matt Stahl, Employee in a Cage? Olivia de Havilland, Warner Bros. Pictures, and the 
“Limit Case” of Star Employment, 12 WARWICK ENT. & SPORTS LAW J. ¶ 1 (2011), 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/eslj/issues/volume12/stahl/ 
[http://perma.cc/4UDY-KDU6]. 
35 See id. ¶ 6; Hollywood Studio System Collection (1913–1948), supra note 33. 
36 See RAMER, supra note 19, at 2. 
37 See De Haviland, 67 Cal. App. 2d at 228–29. 
38 See id. at 232. 
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services,” and that the phrase “for a term not beyond a period of 
seven years” does not carry a hidden meaning.39 The De Haviland 
suit was a “watershed” event in the history of the studio system 
era, which “questioned the whole system of hiring stars on term 
contracts” and led to “stars wrestling control of their careers from 
the studios.”40 
3. The Music Industry Amendments 
Following the De Haviland ruling, the Seven Year Rule applied 
uniformly across the entertainment industry’s many subsets until 
1987, when the Recording Industry Association of America 
(“RIAA”) and major record labels successfully lobbied the Cali-
fornia legislature to amend section 2855.41 Prior to the enactment 
of section 2855(b), recording artists would threaten to invoke the 
Seven Year Rule in their soon-to-expire record deals, whether or 
not there remained unproduced records on the contract.42 Record 
labels often responded to these threats by renegotiating the existing 
contract, rather than pursuing litigation, to keep the artist at the 
label.43 The RIAA and the labels claimed that recording contracts 
are unlike other entertainment industry contracts of “unique and 
special” nature, as they are not historically tied to a time frame so 
much as to the production and delivery of records.44 They also ar-
gued that record companies make large investments in artists who 
are unfairly enriched by simply walking away from a contract with-
out producing the agreed-upon number of albums.45 
The California legislature responded with the introduction of 
section 2855(b), which has three subsections.46 Section 2855(b)(1) 
establishes that the entire amendment pertains to “[a]ny employee 
                                                                                                                            
39 Id. 
40 See Stahl, supra note 34, ¶ 44 (internal citations omitted). 
41 See RAMER, supra note 19, at 2–3. 
42 See Chuck Philips, Lawmakers Take Aim at Music Industry Contracts, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 
8, 2001), http://articles.latimes.com/2001/aug/08/business/fi-31594 [http://perma.cc/
XGV8-UHJ2] [hereinafter Philips, Lawmakers]. 
43 See id. 
44 RAMER, supra note 19, at 3. 
45 Chuck Philips, Courtney Love Seeks To Rock Record Labels’ Contract Policy, L.A. 
TIMES (Feb. 28, 2001), http://articles.latimes.com/2001/feb/28/news/mn-31219 
[http://perma.cc/K7MT-5D9P] [hereinafter Philips, Courtney Love]. 
46 CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855(b) (2014). 
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who is a party to a contract to render personal service in the pro-
duction of phonorecords,” and imposes a written notice require-
ment for these parties to seek nonenforcement pursuant to section 
2855(a), the Seven Year Rule.47 Section 2855(b)(2) permits the re-
covery of damages for a breach of contract that occurs during its 
term, in an action commenced during or after its term.48 Finally, 
section 2855(b)(3) states that a if a party seeking nonenforcement 
“is, or could contractually be, required to render personal service 
in the production of a specified quantity of the phonorecords and 
fails to render all of the required service” prior to giving notice, the 
party “damaged by the failure” is permitted to recover damages 
for each unproduced record.49 
With the enactment of the amendment, however, the labels 
were given clear recourse for remuneration in the event an artist 
sought to end a contract without producing the agreed-upon num-
ber of records.50 Conversely, the amendment represented a “wa-
ter[ing] down” of musicians’ ability to invoke the Seven Year Rule, 
with a “very onerous penalty for exercising rights granted to eve-
ryone else under a personal services employment agreement.”51 
Thus, over the past twenty-eight years, musicians and other activ-
ists have repeatedly asked the California state assembly to repeal 
the 1987 amendment.52 
                                                                                                                            
47 Id. § 2855(b)(1). 
48 Id. § 2855(b)(2). 
49 Id. § 2855(b)(3). 
50 See id. 
51 William I. Hochberg, A Guide To Understanding the “How’s” and “Why’s” of 
Recording Agreements, in 8-159 ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY CONTRACTS ¶ 159.05[3] 
(Donald C. Farber ed., LexisNexis 2015). 
52 See, e.g., Corey Moss, Beck, Deftones, Others Rally For Bill That Could Change 
Recording Contracts, MTV (Jan. 23, 2002), http://www.mtv.com/news/1451908/beck-
deftones-others-rally-for-bill-that-could-change-recording-contracts/ 
[http://perma.cc/4CU9-K4TQ]; Jennifer Toomey, California State Assembly Regarding 
the 7-Year Statute, FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION, https://futureofmusic.org/filing/ 
california-state-assembly-regarding-7-year-statute [https://perma.cc/UEU7-TUDM] 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2015); Teri Vanhorn, Courtney Love, Don Henley, LeAnn Rimes 
Testify on Artists’ Rights, MTV (Sept. 6, 2001), http://www.mtv.com/news/1448678/ 
courtney-love-don-henley-leann-rimes-testify-on-artists-rights/ [http://perma.cc/CX8H-
5X23] (last visited Oct. 30, 2015) (“Courtney Love, Don Henley, and LeAnn Rimes went 
to California’s State Capitol Building on Wednesday to complain about record-company 
business practices and ask for legislation to free musicians from long-term contracts.”); 
see also Hochberg, supra note 51, ¶ 159.05[3] (“California State Senator Kevin Murray 
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B. Structure of Recording Contracts 
Because the music industry is the only subset of the entertain-
ment field that has a “carve out” exception in section 2855, it is 
necessary to understand the difference between record deals and 
other entertainment contracts. Often, actors and actresses work 
with “soft deals,” yet, where a contract does exist, the majority 
represent single picture agreements that do not run the risk of violat-
ing the Seven Year Rule.53 In the television industry, the rule is 
even less likely to cause a problem.54 Television shows that run for 
longer than seven years are typically very popular among viewers, 
thus, these actors and actresses have considerable leverage with 
which to negotiate contracts.55 Finally, and very importantly, 
across film and television deals, the relationship between the actors 
and actresses and the studios or networks is overwhelmingly not an 
exclusive one.56 
Thus, musicians’ employment contracts look very different 
than those formed by their acting peers.57 
                                                                                                                            
introduced into the California legislature SB 1249, the purpose of which was to appeal the 
1987 amendment. The proposed state legislation was aggressively fought by the record 
industry, whose efforts were coordinated by the [RIAA]. Although the legislation was 
stalled, Senator Murray has promised to reintroduce it again and to expand his probe into 
record industry practices, particularly focusing on royalty accounting and payment 
practices.”). 
53 Even in major franchises that require actors and actresses to appear in multiple films, 
section 2855 is typically not implicated: either the films are made within the seven-year 
timeframe, or the actors and actresses are able to secure highly lucrative compensation 
that would prevent them from seeking nonenforcement of a contract. 
54 See discussion infra note 189; see also Nellie Andreeva, The Price of Success: Hit Shows 
Bracing For Cast Exits & Untimely Cancellations, DEADLINE (Apr. 9, 2015, 2:09 PM), 
http://deadline.com/2015/04/cast-members-leaving-shows-renewed-vampire-diaries-
1201405965 [http://perma.cc/WY75-EBRL] (“Cast contract negotiations are considered 
a high-class problem as they are associated with hit series that have gone the distance.”). 
55 See RAMER, supra note 19, at 4; see also Andreeva, supra note 54 (noting the 
difficulties faced by shows that lose stars after their contracts have ended, and the 
increased importance of retaining a star who plays a show’s title character). 
56 See, e.g., Susan Murray, I Know What You Did Last Summer: Sarah Michelle Gellar 
and Crossover Teen Stardom, in UNDEAD TV: ESSAYS ON BUFFY THE VAMPIRE SLAYER 51–
52 (Elana Levine & Lisa Parks eds., 2007) (discussing the role of film projects in the 
career of an actor or actress who has achieved fame in television, and noting that “forays 
into film are particularly alluring to audiences during the summer, when network shows 
are on hiatus”). 
57 See RAMER, supra note 19, at 3. 
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The fundamental legal principle in any agreement 
between a recording artist and a record company is a 
simple copyright transaction: the recording artist 
who provides the talent and marketability, convey 
his or her rights in the sound recording of his or her 
performance to the record company, which provides 
the production, distribution, and marketing re-
sources and expertise.58 
The copyright-owning label manufactures and sells the product 
created by the artist, with whom it shares the revenue, as provided 
by contract.59 
It is safe to say that movie studios, television networks, produc-
tion companies, and record labels all assume some financial risk for 
their projects. Section 2855(b)(3)’s damages provision only applies 
to the music industry, however, which seems to represent the Cali-
fornia legislature’s recognition that the industry’s unique structure 
warranted greater protection for labels, as they “necessarily make 
‘large investments in an artist’s career based primarily on the 
promise that the act [will] deliver’ the contractually stipulated 
number of albums.”60 Thus, if the musician was permitted to walk 
away from the deal without producing the agreed-upon number of 
albums, the record company “would be damaged by not receiving 
the full value of their ‘investment’ in the artist.”61 
This investment in the artist is reflected in the recording con-
tract. A record label does assume the financial risk in production, 
distribution, and marketing,62 but treats these expenditures as ad-
vances to the artist against future royalties.63 If a record is eventual-
ly able to recoup those costs,64 the artist will earn royalties, as sti-
pulated by the contract; if the record is unable to recoup those 
                                                                                                                            
58 COREY FIELD & BARRY I. SLOTNICK, ENTERTAINMENT LAW: FORMS & ANALYSIS 
§ 4.12 (2014). 
59 Id. 
60 Note, California Labor Code Section 2855 and Recording Artists’ Contracts, 116 HARV. 
L. REV. 2632, 2636 (2003) (quoting Philips, Lawmakers, supra note 42). 
61 RAMER, supra note 19, at 3. 
62 See FIELD & SLOTNICK, supra note 58, § 4.12. 
63 Id. 
64 The contract typically specifies the types and amounts of the record label’s 
“recoupable” costs to be charged against the artist’s royalty account. Id. 
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costs, the artist does not have to repay those advances to the la-
bel.65 Thus, unsuccessful records financially harm the labels more 
than the artists who create them; however, the label also stands to 
recoup their costs and profit immensely from successful records. 
In addition to this basic, industry-wide structure of the record-
ing contract, other important issues include: 
 “The scope of exclusive services the artist must 
provide to the label;” 
 “The number of projects or ‘albums’ that must 
be delivered by the artist pursuant to ‘options’ 
held by the record company;” 
 “The advances payable to the artist for each 
album;” and 
 The royalties the artist will receive and the 
royalty costs for the producer of the 
recordings.66 
These four major issues help to highlight the differences in the 
interests of the record labels and the artists when disputes under 
section 2855 arise. 
1. Scope of Exclusivity 
Recording contracts require that the artist produce recordings 
exclusively for the label.67 As discussed above in Part I.A.2, De Ha-
viland represented a victory for the artist and helped end the period 
in Hollywood history marked by powerful studios and exclusive 
actor contracts.68 During the studio system era, the perception was 
that the studio “created” the movie stars: “[they] were recruited 
by the studio’s talent scouts, groomed by the studios, and signed to 
seven-year contracts.”69 These contracts required the actor- and 
actress-employees to participate in social activities and open their 
lives to the media.70 After De Haviland, actors and actresses were 
                                                                                                                            
65 Id. 
66 Id. (formatting altered). 
67 Id. § 4.12[1][a]. Non-exclusive contracts are very unusual in the industry and would 
require a different analysis of the fairness of section 2855(b)’s limitations on musicians. 
68 See supra note 40. 
69 DANIEL NIEMEYER, 1950S AMERICAN STYLE: A REFERENCE GUIDE 63 (2013). 
70 See id. 
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not bound to serve the studio for longer than the maximum term 
length;71 because they knew exactly when their contracts were end-
ing, they were able to shop around the industry for better scripts, 
directors, and projects.72 
After De Haviland, a “free agency” structure began to replace 
the studio system as actors and actresses gained more power in ne-
gotiating employment contracts based on their fair market value.73 
In a free agency market, actors and actresses are not bound to one 
studio for an extended, long-term contract, but rather, are free to 
create films with whomever they want.74 Today, the benefit of this 
system to the actors and actresses is clear, as they can embark on a 
project with a clear understanding of its timeline and the prepara-
tion and skills required, as well as negotiate their salary or compen-
sation structure based on their market value. They are bound to 
studios on a project-by-project basis, rather than for a set length of 
time, and with less limited exclusivity provisions: actors and ac-
tresses are typically permitted to engage in other business dealings 
with other production entities, even while working on another 
project.75 
                                                                                                                            
71 See De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 67 Cal. App. 2d 225, 231–32 (1944). 
72 WHEELER WINSTON DIXON, DEATH OF THE MOGULS: THE END OF CLASSICAL 
HOLLYWOOD 20 (2012). 
73 See A. Barry Cappello & Troy A. Thielemann, Challenging the Practices of the 
Recording Industry, L.A. LAWYER, May 2002, at 14–19, http://www.lacba.org/Files/LAL/ 
Vol25No3/1127.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z2TJ-MPJJ]. 
74 DIXON, supra note 72, at 20. 
75 Both film and television stars face less restrictive employment relationships with 
their networks and studios than musicians and their labels. Still, when selecting additional 
television projects, actors and actresses are often limited to appear only on shows on their 
television show’s network or network’s affiliates. Compare Janet Kinosian, Academy 
Awards: For J.K. Simmons of “Whiplash,” the Beat Never Slows, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2015, 
8:15 AM), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/la-et-mn-en-jk-simmons-
academy-awards-20150205-story.html [http://perma.cc/8PJA-338L] (discussing actor 
J.K. Simmons’s hectic 2015 award season, which included appearances at many award 
shows, filming a movie, and hosting Saturday Night Live), with Dorothy Pomerantz, Joel 
McHale Is a Very Busy Man, FORBES (May 18, 2011, 10:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/ 
2011/05/17/celebrity-100-11-joel-mchale-community-soup-e-nbc-popularity.html 
[http://perma.cc/EG3A-2BNG] (discussing actor Joel McHale’s starring roles in 
Community and The Soup, television shows on NBC Universal networks NBC and E!, 
respectively, while also appearing in three films and doing standup) and James Hibberd, 
ABC Orders Prank Show Inspired by Ellen DeGeneres, ENT. WEEKLY (Jan. 14, 2015, 12:15 
PM), http://www.ew.com/article/2015/01/14/abc-ellen-degeneres-prank [http://perma. 
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On the opposite end of the spectrum, a “360 deal” is fully 
broad in scope; it encompasses everything that an artist can hold 
rights to and can earn revenue from—including music sales, tour-
ing, merchandising, fan-club fees, endorsements, licensing, appear-
ances, and often includes sharing with the artist the publishing 
rights for compositions recorded under contract.76 Unlike free 
agency, where a person has the ability to negotiate with and enter 
into contracts easily, a 360 deal represents a highly exclusive rela-
tionship between label and artist.77 Music contracts are increasingly 
closer to 360 deals because of the reduction in traditional album 
sales from increased online streaming.78 
Because the Big Three labels have considerable institutional 
power in the industry,79 they are able to set standards for the way 
music contracts are constructed.80 Artists lack the ability to nego-
tiate a contract with a major record label from scratch and rather 
simply agree to a variation of the standard contract.81 This struc-
ture of exclusivity both prevents musicians from negotiating short-
                                                                                                                            
cc/L2MA-3VLN] (discussing the launch of an ABC show, Repeat After Me, hosted by 
actress Wendi McLendon-Covey, who appears on another ABC show, The Goldbergs). 
76 Ian Brereton, Note and Recent Development, The Beginning of A New Age?: The 
Unconscionability of the “360-Degree” Deal, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 167, 193 
(2009). 
77 See id. 
78 See Michael Arrington, “360” Music Deals Become Mandatory As Labels Prepare For 
Free Music, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 8, 2008), http://techcrunch.com/2008/11/08/360-
music-deals-become-mandatory-as-labels-prepare-for-free-music 
[http://perma.cc/V5DJ-H8Y2]. 
79 See id. (discussing the evolution of 360 deals from “controversial” and 
“experimental” to mandatory, as Warner Music Group adopted the model); see also 
Brereton, supra note 76, at 178 (noting that even though the then-“Big Four” stronghold 
on the music industry in the United States had declined, bands and artists were still more 
likely to achieve commercial success by signing with a major label versus an independent 
one); Pollock, supra note 12. 
80 See Brereton, supra note 76, at 177–78 (“Even for artists who obtain an attorney, the 
standard major label recording agreement can span one hundred pages, containing 
legalese and hidden meanings that demand counsel specializing in music law. Such an 
agreement is ‘virtually impossible’ for an unrepresented artist to comprehend. 
Additionally, these contracts endeavor to protect the major labels at all costs.”). 
81 Id. at 178, 182 (noting that “[m]any of the principal terms, through repeated usage, 
have come to constitute non-negotiable industry standards or, at best, negotiable within 
limits established by the labels over time,” and giving an example of a point that is 
“negotiable within limits” as the exact royalty percentage the new artist receives as 
typically between ten and twelve percent of the suggested retail list price). 
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term contracts with labels based on the artist’s market value and 
protects labels by allowing them to retain control over their artists 
who are actually successful.82 
2. Term Length; Number of Albums 
Another basic industry standard is the term of the agreement: 
recording contracts contain an “initial contract period” in which 
the artist must produce “one, or at most, two albums,” followed by 
multiple, successive options for additional albums.83 The initial 
contract period allows the label to assess the commercial viability 
of the artist, and reduces its financial risk by allowing the label not 
to renew the contract for the option periods.84 If the label exercises 
its options, there is no way to determine how long the contract will 
actually last, as these are measured in both time and product:85 
[After the initial contract period, t]he agreement 
then provides the record company with multiple, 
successive options that it can exercise in its discre-
tion to cause the artist to record additional product, 
with each option calling for a limited amount of 
product such as an additional phonograph record al-
bum for the option period so exercised. That prod-
uct then becomes the “minimum delivery require-
ment” for that particular option period. Each con-
tract period, whether the initial period or an option 
period, is generally defined as a period of time con-
sisting of a number of months, usually between sev-
en and eighteen, that follows the delivery of the last 
record required to be recorded in satisfaction of the 
minimum delivery requirement for that particular 
contract period. The actual term of the agreement is 
defined as the period commencing from the initial 
                                                                                                                            
82 See Philips, Lawmakers, supra note 42. 
83 Gary Stiffleman & Bonnie Greenberg, Exclusive Recording Agreements Between An 
Artist and A Record Company, in 8-159 ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY CONTRACTS, supra 
note 51, ¶ 159.03[1][a]; see also FIELD & SLOTNICK, supra note 58, § 4.12[1][c]. 
84 Stiffleman & Greenberg, supra note 83, ¶ 159.03[1][a]. 
85 Id. 
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period and continuing to the end of the last option 
period.86 
Additionally, after the contract is drafted, the label unilaterally 
has the power to decide whether to exercise any—or all—of these 
options; the artist is bound to the option periods whether or not 
doing so remains a beneficial career move.87 Thus, the artist whose 
label has exercised these options is obligated to produce the total 
number of records designated by the initial contract period plus 
those required by the option periods.88 
3. Advances Payable to Artist Per Album and Recoupable 
Costs 
At the start of the initial contract period and the option periods, 
record labels pay their artists an advance, which provides both a 
salary and upfront money for some production costs.89 Section 
3423 of the California Civil Code90 mandates that labels must guar-
antee artists certain amounts of money each year under contract in 
order to bring an action to enjoin the artist in a breach of contract 
claim, thus, this money is usually incorporated into the advance.91 
                                                                                                                            
86 Id. 
87 Kaleena Scamman, ADR in the Music Industry: Tailoring Dispute Resolution to the 
Different Stages of the Artist-Label Relationship, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 269, 281 
(2008). 
88 Id.; see also FIELD & SLOTNICK, supra note 58, § 4.12. Note that the contract specifies 
the option periods in terms of length of time and in delivery requirement. Thus, even if it 
is not possible to determine exactly how long a contract will last when it is formed, it is 
somewhat easy to determine if it will be able to be completed in seven years by adding the 
length of the initial period to the option periods and accounting for industry standards for 
the rate at which artists can produce albums. See Philips, Lawmakers, supra note 42; see 
also infra Part II. 
89 See FIELD & SLOTNICK, supra note 58, § 4.12[1][f]; Stiffleman & Greenberg, supra 
note 83, ¶ 159.03[1][c]. This money is also referred to as a “recording fund.” Part of the 
contract negotiations focus on which production costs are recoupable by the label. FIELD 
& SLOTNICK, supra note 58, § 4.12[1][f], [1][n] (noting that certain costs, like the creation 
of music videos, may be covered up to an amount by the label, with the remainder 
recoupable against the artist’s royalty account). 
90 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3423 (2014). 
91 Hochberg, supra note 51, ¶ 159.05[2][a][ii] (explaining section 3423, known as the 
“$9,000 Plus Provision,” which contractually requires a label to guarantee the artist 
$9,000 by the end of the first contract year, $12,000 by the end of the second contract 
year, $15,000 by the end of contract years three through seven, in addition to additional 
stipulated payments in years four through seven). 
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The advances are usually six-figure sums; however, most of that 
money is recoupable against the artist’s royalties in the future.92 As 
far as the artist can control the expenses of producing the album, 
the artist is incentivized to be cost-efficient because he or she can 
keep the remaining money as an advance against future royalties.93 
Therefore, after the artist is paid the advance, he or she does not 
begin to earn royalties until the advance has been earned back.94 
Additionally, although the artist is not typically required to pay the 
label any amount from the advance that is not earned back in reve-
nue from the album, unsuccessful records can drive artists’ royalty 
accounts into deep deficits.95 These advances may be used to re-
coup losses on a “cross-collateral” basis among all master record-
ings under the contract: the artist’s advance for one album may be 
used to recoup other projects of the artist that were not success-
ful.96 An artist whose record does not perform well—in terms of 
sales, touring, licensing, etc.—may not profit at all from the crea-
tion of the record, and is either dropped from the label and or left 
in debt to begin the next project.97 In sum, each record must be 
successful enough, at a bare minimum, to recoup the artists’ ad-
vances from the label in order for the artist to remain financially 
viable. 
4. Artist Royalties and Royalty Costs for Producer of 
Recordings 
Labels pay royalties to the artist based on record sales, calcu-
lated either by using the suggested retail list price (“SRLP”) of the 
recordings, or on the net revenue that is actually received by the 
label.98 Royalty rates fluctuate throughout an artist’s career and 
can range from 8% to 25% of retail prices.99 Artists at the beginning 
                                                                                                                            
92 See ARTIFACT (Sisyphus Corporation 2012) (describing the process by which artists 
are paid, including 30 Seconds To Mars’ $500,000 advances from EMI that were later 
recovered against for costs incurred from album production); see also FIELD & SLOTNICK, 
supra note 58, § 4.12. 
93 See FIELD & SLOTNICK, supra note 58, § 4.12. 
94 Id. 
95 FIELD & SLOTNICK, supra note 58, § 4.12[1][f]. 
96 See Stiffleman & Greenberg, supra note 83, ¶ 159.03[1][c]. 
97 See ARTIFACT, supra note 92. 
98 See FIELD & SLOTNICK, supra note 58, § 4.12[1][i]. 
99 See Scamman, supra note 87, at 275. 
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of their careers may sign contracts for relatively low royalty percen-
tages of the SLRP, with the potential for small percentage “bump-
ups” for subsequent albums and special incentives for certain sales 
performance.100 The calculation of royalties and assessment of a 
fair rate is further complicated by technological advancements and 
new methods of music consumption: the popularization of stream-
ing music has ushered in new questions on how to effectively mo-
netize these channels at a good royalty rate.101 
II. THE PROBLEM WITH SECTION 2855(b) 
Although section 2855(b) was enacted nearly thirty years ago, 
there is very little case law to predict how California courts would 
handle disputes between labels and their musicians, as they are of-
ten negotiated and not litigated.102 Circularly, this lack of jurispru-
dence creates much uncertainty surrounding the potential outcome 
of litigation, giving the parties, especially the labels, an even clearer 
benefit to resolve the dispute out of court.103 Currently, section 
2855(b) is problematic for a few reasons: it grants labels the right to 
recover damages for undelivered albums, but gives no further guid-
ance on how these damages should be calculated;104 it was enacted 
on the flawed premise that the music industry, as a whole, would 
be harmed if labels were not expressly granted this right to recover 
                                                                                                                            
100 See FIELD & SLOTNICK, supra note 58, § 4.12[1][i]. 
101 See Glenn Peoples, Music Streaming Now Generates Trillions of Plays—But Are 
Royalties Keeping Up?, BILLBOARD (Aug. 13, 2015, 2:39 PM), http://www.billboard.com/ 
articles/business/6663783/music-streaming-now-generates-trillions-of-plays-but-are-
royalties-keeping [http://perma.cc/EHZ6-VAMY]. 
102 See, e.g., RAMER, supra note 19, at 3 (noting that section 2855(b)(3) seems geared to 
force settlement); Todd Martens, 30 Seconds to Mars and EMI Make Nice, New Album Due 
This Fall, L.A. TIMES BLOG (Apr. 28, 2009, 6:48 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/ 
music_blog/2009/04/30-seconds-to-mars-and-emi-make-nice-new-album-due-this-
fall.html [http://perma.cc/PK2S-YZPW] (“It certainly is not fun being in litigation. I 
would avoid it at all costs.”); Philips, Courtney Love, supra note 45 (“Earlier possible 
showdowns over the statute, including cases by Beck, Don Henley and Luther Vandross, 
were averted when industry attorneys convinced the artists to settle out of court for 
multimillion-dollar advances.”). 
103 Tracy C. Gardner, Note, Expanding the Rights of Recording Artists: An Argument to 
Repeal Section 2855(b) of the California Labor Code, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 721, 756 (2007) 
(“Record companies with vast resources may continue to press for settlement in 
important cases they fear they may lose to keep these issues safe from judicial review.”). 
104 See infra Part II.A. 
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damages;105 and it unfairly exempts musicians from the long-
standing protection of the Seven Year Rule.106 
A. Assessment of Damages 
Section 2855(b)(3) grants labels the right to recover damages 
for each record that is not produced in the event that a recording 
artist seeks to end his or her contract under the Seven Year Rule.107 
It states: 
If a party to a contract described in paragraph (1) [an 
artist] is, or could contractually be, required to 
render personal service in the production of a speci-
fied quantity of the phonorecords and fails to render 
all of the required service prior to the date specified 
in the notice provided in paragraph (1), the party 
damaged by the failure shall have the right to recover 
damages for each phonorecord as to which that party has 
failed to render service in an action that, notwith-
standing paragraph (2), shall be commenced within 
45 days after the date specified in the notice.108 
Commentators agree that identifying the criteria to determine 
damages in a breach of contract action under section 2855(b)(3) is 
problematic: 
[W]hat are the damages? The actual money that the 
record company is out of pocket with respect to the 
undelivered records? The record companies don’t 
want that; they probably haven’t spent anything, 
yet. Lost profits from the undelivered records? Lost 
profits are notoriously hard to quantify. Obviously, 
undelivered records by bona fide stars theoretically 
could mean millions in lost profits.109 
These vague terms, like “actual money” spent or “lost prof-
its,” are inherently theoretical when determining the value of a 
                                                                                                                            
105 See infra Part II.B. 
106 See infra Part II.C. 
107 CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855(b)(3) (2014). 
108 Id. (emphasis added). 
109 RAMER, supra note 19, at 3. 
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record that has not yet been produced, marketed, distributed, and 
sold.110 Section 2855(b)(3) “seems uniquely geared to forcing set-
tlement,”111 failing to specify any method or guidance for calculat-
ing these damages. 
A 2008 dispute between 30 Seconds to Mars (“30STM”) and 
their label, EMI,112 highlights this problem.113 Directed by the 
band’s front man, film star Jared Leto, the 2014 documentary Arti-
fact chronicled the band’s production of their third album,114 as 
they grew more and more entrenched in legal battles with EMI that 
appeared on-track to see the inside of a courtroom.115 Unhappy 
with EMI, the band had attempted to leave the label, based on their 
belief that their 1999 contract was no longer enforceable as it was 
beyond the seven-year threshold.116 Although the band was alleged-
ly in “millions of dollars of debt” to the label, EMI sued 30STM 
for thirty million dollars, pursuant to section 2855(b)(3), as the 
band had three undelivered albums remaining on its contract.117 
Neither the band nor the label had the ability to review previous 
decisions of California courts to predict the possible outcome of the 
case, weigh the costs and benefits of litigation, or whether the label 
even had standing to sue under section 2855(b)(3).118 Further, the 
band believed EMI was using the lawsuit as intimidation to keep 
them tethered to their contract, claiming millions of dollars in 
damages the label knew 30STM simply could not pay.119 
30STM eventually settled the matter with the label in an undis-
closed renegotiated agreement and released the album This Is War 
                                                                                                                            
110 See Philips, Courtney Love, supra note 45; see infra Part III.A.2. 
111 See RAMER, supra note 19, at 3. 
112 EMI is no longer an independent record label, and has since been acquired by Sony. 
See Ben Sisario, Sony Closes Its Acquisition of EMI Music Publishing, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 
2012, 9:08 AM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/29/passing-final-
hurdle-sonys-deal-for-emi-publishing-is-approved-by-u-s [http://perma.cc/F3K8-M2K6]. 
113 Natalie Robehmed, Jared Leto Wages War On The Music Industry, FORBES (Dec. 4, 
2013, 12:01 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/natalierobehmed/2013/12/04/jared-leto-
wages-war-on-the-music-industry [http://perma.cc/Y7WN-EQ65]. 
114 The album is appropriately titled This is War. 
115 See ARTIFACT, supra note 92. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id.; see also CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855(b)(3) (2014). 
119 ARTIFACT, supra note 92. 
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with EMI.120 Still, in the final seconds of Artifact, the band states 
they have “never been paid for the sales of any of their albums,” 
but that the label continues to claim the band was in debt to 
them.121 
Artifact illustrates the narrative of these contractual disputes: 
the musician or band provides notice to the label as required by 
section 2855(b)(1), then the label responds with a lawsuit claiming 
millions of dollars for any unproduced records remaining on con-
tract, which, in turn, initiates negotiation of the parties to settle.122 
Labels have the statutory right to recover damages to limit financial 
loss caused by unfulfilled, but promised, album delivery.123 Howev-
er, with no further specification or statutory limitation on damages, 
the labels can file multi-million dollar lawsuits against bands whose 
finances they closely control. 
B. The Reality of the Music Industry124 
In lobbying for the 1987 amendment, the RIAA argued that art-
ists would be unfairly enriched if they could simply walk away after 
a time period without producing the agreed-upon number of al-
bums.125 The labels claimed they bared the financial risk in signing, 
promoting, and marketing their musicians, thus, they argued that 
without protection against artists who wanted to jump ship without 
fulfilling their contractual duties, they would be detrimentally 
                                                                                                                            
120 Id.; see also Martens, supra note 102. 
121 See ARTIFACT, supra note 92. 
122 See id. 
123 See LAB. § 2855(b)(3); supra discussion Part I.B. 
124 This Note focuses the discussion of the “reality” of the music industry on the 
feasibility on completing a standard contract within a seven-year frame, in order to 
concentrate analysis on the fairness of section 2855(b) and the Seven Year Rule. An 
entirely separate Note could focus on the technological advances in music in the past 
thirty years to further justify that section 2855(b) needs reform. For example, in 1987, 
CDs were the new, popular method of music distribution, which made record companies 
with existing libraries of songs very lucrative businesses. See Gardner, supra note 103, at 
747. Although the process of creating an album, from start to finish, is very different in 
2015 than it was thirty years ago, the industry’s business practices have been slow to 
change: recording contracts are still structured as if the physical distribution of music, 
through CDs or records, is the primary delivery method to consumers. See Stiffleman & 
Greenberg, supra note 83, ¶ 159.03[2][d]. 
125 See Philips, Lawmakers, supra note 42. 
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harmed.126 Finally, they argued that the Seven Year Rule, in the 
context of the music industry, did not recognize that record com-
panies made “large investments in an artist’s career based primari-
ly on the promise that the act would deliver a certain number of 
albums under the contract—typically seven recordings,” but that 
the labels “don’t earn money on successful artists until after the 
fourth album.”127 In practice, however, it is very unlikely that a la-
bel would exercise its options on an artist who is not successful by 
the second album.128 
Artists who seek nonenforcement of their contract deals under 
section 2855(a) often note that it is not possible to produce the 
number of albums designated by contract within seven years.129 
Given that an album “cycle,” the “overall period encompassing 
the creation and release of an album, including the subsequent 
touring and promotion,” generally takes two to three years, con-
tracts for five to seven albums can take well over a decade to com-
plete.130 Even if an artist wanted to produce an album per year for 
seven years in order to complete her contractual obligations within 
seven years, the label is ultimately the decision-maker in scheduling 
these releases.131 Yet, there is no limit on the number of options a 
label can include in a recording contract, thus, a label is free to in-
clude upwards of five option periods, fully knowing the contract 
could never be completed within the seven year frame.132 Although 
artists are, of course, free to enter into recording contracts, labels 
have much more industry-knowledge than new artists signing their 
first-ever recording deal, who have very little experience and al-
                                                                                                                            
126 See supra Part I.A.3; see also Philips, Courtney Love, supra note 45. 
127 See Philips, Lawmakers, supra note 42. 
128 Id. 
129 See, e.g., Vanhorn, supra note 52 (quoting Courtney Love—“I don’t care what the 
[industry] says to you today; they lied to you . . . I cannot make seven albums in seven 
years. They will not let me.”—and LeAnn Rimes—“At 12, I was thrilled to sign my 
contract with Curb Records . . . just turned 19 last month, and if I record at a rate of one 
album every two years, which is the industry average, I will be 35 before the contract is 
over.”). 
130 FIELD & SLOTNICK, supra note 58, § 4.12[1][c]. 
131 Vanhorn, supra note 52. 
132 See id. 
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most no bargaining power or control over the working relation-
ship.133 
C. The Seven Year Rule, De Haviland, and Unconscionability 
Before the amendment, California courts applied the Seven 
Year Rule to personal service contracts in the music industry.134 
When artists neared the end of the seven years on their contracts, 
they would threaten to leave the label; the labels, fearful of losing 
successful artists, would renegotiate these contracts.135 This imbal-
ance of power seemed to weigh entirely in favor of the artists; how-
ever, an artist who is still under contract near the end of the seven 
years has almost certainly been a financial success for the label.136 
As the label alone decides whether to exercise the options after the 
initial contract period, and often decides to drop artists who are 
unsuccessful,137 those who are able to exert leverage near the end of 
a seven-year contract are comparatively few.138 Labels have an in-
terest in keeping their successful artists under contract, just as 
Warner Brothers had an interest in retaining rising star Olivia de 
Havilland for another six months.139 By holding that the Seven Year 
Rule was unequivocally measured in calendar years and not actual 
service, the court ensured that studios could not find ways around 
section 2855.140 
                                                                                                                            
133 According to Dexter Holland of the band The Offspring, recording artists sign these 
contracts in good faith, fully intending to honor them. But the record companies know 
from experience that it is highly unlikely artists will be able to fulfill their requirements 
due to the demands they place on the artists, including touring, video shoots, and other 
marketing chores. See Moss, supra note 52. 
134 Id. 
135 See Philips, Lawmakers, supra note 42. 
136 Id. (“Although companies do spend vast sums of money signing and marketing 
unknown acts, it’s the rare label that holds on to an act that isn’t successful by its second 
album.”). 
137 See Scamman, supra note 87, at 274. 
138 Just as many more albums are released each year than are considered “successful,” 
many more artists are signed to labels that never amass popular or critical acclaim. See, 
e.g., Chuck Philips, Recording Stars Challenge Music Labels’ Business Practices, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 
29, 2001), http://articles.latimes.com/2001/mar/29/news/mn-44202 [http://perma.cc/
6NNG-Q25C] [hereinafter Philips, Recording Stars]. 
139 See generally De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 67 Cal. App. 2d 225 (1944). 
140 Id. at 231–34. 
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The “unjust enrichment” reasoning behind the 1987 amend-
ment is analogous to the argument that Warner Brothers “discov-
ered” Ms. de Havilland and produced movies that made her fam-
ous. They found her roles and financially backed her projects. They 
were a pivotal player in her success. Still, the court found, they 
were not entitled to bind her to service for an indefinite length of 
time.141 Even though the studio had made apparent investments, 
financial and otherwise, in her career, that investment did not en-
title Warner Brothers to lengthen her seven-year contract.142 The 
California legislature originally enacted section 2855 (and earlier, 
section 1980 of the Civil Code)143 “to protect against involuntary 
servitude in the form of unconscionable employment agree-
ments.”144 Yet, the California legislature essentially sanctioned in-
voluntary servitude with the passage of section 2855(b): artists are 
forced to continue working for their labels indefinitely,145 because 
any future profits made under a new label for the unproduced al-
bums on the original contract would be owed to the old label as 
damages.146 It is, of course, highly unlikely that a new label will sign 
an artist whose profits are owed to a different label. 
Musicians believe the amendment “plainly discriminates” 
against artists in their industry, as “recording contracts” are the 
only named exception in the statute.147 In opposing the 1987 
amendment, the “artistic community was extremely upset . . . as it 
saw its rights under the seven year rule watered down” by such a 
potentially large penalty.148 Because the threat of monetary damag-
                                                                                                                            
141 Id. at 233–34. 
142 Id. 
143 See supra Part I. 
144 Gardner, supra note 103, at 727 (citing Revella Cook, The Impact of Digital 
Distribution on the Duration of Recording Contracts, 6 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 40, 42 
(2003)); see also Omar Anorga, Note, Music Contracts Have Musicians Playing in the Key of 
Unconscionability, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 739, 747 (2003). 
145 The “indefiniteness” of this contract term relates to the length of time only, as the 
contract would end definitely when the final album on the contract was delivered. 
146 See Cappello & Thielemann, supra note 73, at 19. 
147 See Toomey, supra note 52; see also CAL. LAB. CODE. § 2855(b) (2014). 
148 Hochberg, supra note 51, ¶ 159.05[2][a][vii]; see also Philips, Lawmakers, supra note 
42 (“‘It’s unfathomable to me how the record companies were able to secure an 
exemption to single out one class of people, namely musical artists, to be unprotected by 
California labor law,’ [singer Don] Henley said. ‘How can everybody else be protected 
but us?’”). 
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es is enough to keep an artist tethered to the contract, musicians 
argue that the statute promotes unconscionable contracts that es-
sentially leave the artist no other option, financially, but to per-
form.149 
III. FIXING THE MUSICIAN EXEMPTION 
Currently, the wording of section 2855(b) is vague and ambi-
guous. Without judicial review, there is little guidance for inter-
preting exactly how to calculate the damages it entitles labels to re-
ceive. Through reform, the California legislature could protect 
both the record labels from unjust enrichment when lucrative art-
ists reap the benefits of label management, and allow musicians to 
seek nonenforcement of a contract that has been unfairly con-
structed to keep them under the label’s control for longer than the 
Seven Year Rule allows. However, it is worth noting that each of 
these potential solutions is only possible through collective action 
of artists and other music industry players. A push in 2001–2002 
showed signs of momentum towards repealing section 2855(b) and 
securing other improvements for musicians, including the explora-
tion of forming a labor union for recording artists,150 however, 
these efforts ultimately failed.151 
A. Amend Section 2855(b) 
1. Limitations at Contract Formation 
Without considering the feasibility for parties to fulfill contrac-
tual obligations within the seven-year timeframe, the California leg-
islature took away the protections of the Seven Year Rule for musi-
cians by inserting monetary penalties.152 One potential amendment 
                                                                                                                            
149 See Cappello & Thielemann, supra note 73, at 16 (“Recording artists have alleged 
that the industry’s position imposes involuntary servitude, which exists when the victim 
has ‘no available choice but to work or be subject to legal sanction.’”) (quoting United 
States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942–43 (1988)). 
150 See Philips, Recording Stars, supra note 138. 
151 Chuck Philips, Bill on Free Agency for Artists Dies, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2002), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2002/aug/16/business/fi-7year16 [http://perma.cc/KGW2-
8MPV] [hereinafter Philips, Bill on Free Agency]. 
152 See Vanhorn, supra note 52. 
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to section 2855(b) could include a limit on the total number of al-
bums number or number of option terms permitted in a recording 
contract. The current section 2855(b)(3) does not limit the number 
of records the parties can contract for, however, it gives the labels 
free range to collect damages for all records that are unproduced 
when an artist seeks to end the relationship, even after the seven 
year limit has lapsed.153 
One possible way to limit the length of the contract term during 
contract formation would be to institute a “maximum album” pro-
vision, prohibiting contracting above a set number of albums within 
the seven-year period that are simply not feasible to produce.154 
Imposing a limitation on the total number of albums required in a 
contract to three or four total albums would “allow recording art-
ists’ contracts to operate better within the bounds of section 
2855.”155 A maximum number of contractually required albums 
would address the music industry’s concerns in lobbying for 
amendment in continuing to provide the opportunity to recover 
damages for unproduced albums, however, it would also make the 
“artist’s delivery of all the contractual albums a reasonable expec-
tation.”156 
Although the inclusion of an upper limit on the number of al-
bums would certainly lead to more realistic contracts, this solution 
is not ideal. First, it is likely a shortsighted fix: there is no way to 
predict that the future sale of music will be predicated on album 
production, the way it is today. If the industry dictates a different 
dominant method of music delivery (for example, perhaps only 
with the creation and release of singles, rather than entire albums), 
the law will be slow to adapt and will create additional contract 
formation issues. Further, a limitation based on the industry right 
now will fail to account for differences in production that occur in 
the future; if artists and labels are able to produce albums more 
quickly, or if the industry emphasis on touring continues to in-
                                                                                                                            
153 See supra Part II.B. 
154 See Note, supra note 60, at 2650–52 (suggesting a reduction in the number of 
contractually required albums so the artist and label have a more realistic possibility of 
performing the contract’s terms). 
155 Id. at 2652. 
156 Id. 
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crease and lengthens the average time between albums, the provi-
sion would be of very little help. Additionally, the insertion of a 
“maximum album” provision requires the legislature to play ex-
pert in a field in which it likely knows very little. It would likely be 
very difficult for the legislature to decide the exact number for a 
statutory limit simply by weighing competing testimony and infor-
mation, as mere trends in the industry are not inclusive of all musi-
cians and their labels’ agreements. 
Another option is a limitation on the number of total option pe-
riods in a contract. If the legislature imposed a limit on these op-
tions to enable them to more reasonably be completed within seven 
years, artists would be able to end their contractual obligations 
sooner and reenter the market as free agents. Still, much like the 
potential problems created by a “maximum album” provision, a 
“maximum options” provision would likely be problematic. A leg-
islature-created statutory maximum could stifle the industry, lessen 
the freedom of these parties to create contracts, and force legal so-
lutions to future problems based on current information. 
2. Define “Damages” 
As discussed above in Part II.A, section 2855(b) does not define 
the “damages” it allows the label to recover for “each phonore-
cord” the artist under contract fails to deliver.157 Given that this 
number is incredibly speculative, labels are able to set the amount 
of damages using whatever calculation is most advantageous. Thus, 
labels often seek damages in the form of lost profits, based on the 
“expected profits on the additional albums that artists have neither 
delivered nor created,”158 often a much higher number than the 
actual loss incurred in financing the artist’s career.159 Although la-
bels claim that the loss of profit is appropriate given the investment 
in the artist and the financial necessity for the label to recover on 
                                                                                                                            
157 CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855(b)(3) (2014). 
158 Cappello & Thielemann, supra note 73, at 17. 
159 This is a logical conclusion based on the fact that the label would not wish to keep an 
artist long-term if the artist was not profitable. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the 
label’s costs associated with that artist outweigh the potential revenue it seeks to generate 
from that artist. 
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the potentially lucrative unproduced albums,160 it is often impossi-
ble to calculate a justifiable figure upon which to base an estimate. 
The following example of Alanis Morissette illustrates the difficul-
ty in predicting album sales for an artist: 
[W]hat if [she] left her label after seven years and 
still owed the company four albums? It’s unclear 
whether the company would be allowed to base the 
value of damages on her 30-million selling hit, 
“Jagged Little Pill,” or her follow-up, “Supposed 
Former Infatuation Junkie,” which sold just 2 mil-
lion copies.161 
Even if an artist has a sizeable sales track record from which to 
base an estimate of future earnings, the growing popularity of 
streaming services makes reasonable predictions of album sales in-
creasingly difficult.162 California law requires that the process of 
computing damages be “reasonable.” Without a justifiable way to 
determine how to estimate the potential lost profit from unpro-
duced albums, “[t]he process of estimating lost profits would 
therefore be unreasonably speculative.”163 
Although “lost profits” does not seem to yield a reasonable 
calculation of damages, actual damages, or “actual artist invest-
ment,” which might include only the advances paid to the artist 
and other recoupable expenditures incurred by the label,164 is not 
much better. If artists are liable for paying back the recoupable 
costs of making their album, they will find themselves in the same 
situation they are currently in: tethered to contracts because they 
                                                                                                                            
160 See Note, supra note 60, at 2646 (“A small number of successful albums fuel the 
record industry, both making it profitable and allowing companies to invest in new 
artists.”). 
161 See Philips, Lawmakers, supra note 42. 
162 Through streaming services and Internet radio, consumers are listening to music all 
the time: in the first half of 2015, listeners streamed over 1.03 trillion songs. See Peoples, 
supra note 101 (citing Data to Date: The Rapid Rise of Social and Streaming, NEXT BIG 
SOUND, https://www.nextbigsound.com/industryreport/2015summer [http://perma.cc/ 
M9EH-AZ39] (last visited Nov. 9, 2015)). The massive popularity of streaming services 
highlights the need to monetize these streams at appropriate royalty rates, which is a 
slowly-evolving process. See id. 
163 See Note, supra note 60, at 2646. 
164 Id. at 2647–48. 
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are unable to crawl out of debt. The artist is in no better a position 
to determine the potential success of an album than the label is; 
artists do not often know they are creating and recording an album 
that will not sell any more than a label knows it is marketing and 
promoting a flop. As the parties embark on that risk together, it is 
unfair to penalize the artist alone for an album that does not recoup 
its production expenses, as these costs alone are typically prohibi-
tively high enough to keep the artist (whose album has not generat-
ed enough royalties to be profitable, given the artist’s position) 
bound to the label. 
A fair damage award would only allow the label to recover for 
advances paid or costs incurred for an album that was never rec-
orded.165 In this scenario, an artist would be responsible for repay-
ing money given to produce an album that was not delivered. Al-
though this option may also leave artists without recourse to leave 
the label, depending on the artist’s finances, it produces a more 
equitable outcome. Labels will be protected against spending mon-
ey on projects whose revenue they will lose, and artists will not be 
able to keep money for a project they wish to take elsewhere.166 By 
limiting damages only to advances and costs for the undelivered al-
bums, the amendment would not likely retain its current power to 
allow labels to threaten expensive, time consuming, and intimidat-
ing lawsuits.167 Thus, the legislature must use language in section 
2855(b)(3) to specify that “the party damaged by the failure shall 
have the right to recover damages for each phonorecord as to 
which that party has failed to render service” no greater than the 
actual costs incurred in production of the undelivered phonorecords. 
B. Repeal Section 2855(b) 
Over the past twenty-five years, artists have unsuccessfully at-
tempted to lobby the California legislature to repeal section 2855(b) 
                                                                                                                            
165 See id. at 2847–48. 
166 See id. Additionally, this limit will address the concerns of a spokesperson for the 
RIAA, who stated in 2001, when the amendment was gaining significant challengers: 
“There is not going to be sympathy for [artists] when they take multimillion-dollar 
advances from the companies and then just walk away before they fulfill the obligations in 
their contracts.” See Philips, Lawmakers, supra note 42. 
167 See ARTIFACT, supra note 92. 
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to eliminate the music industry amendments.168 The California leg-
islature held hearings in 2001 to reexamine the issue and drafted 
Senate Bill 1246 to repeal the amendment, however, it was dropped 
the following year at the request of the artists’ representatives and 
would not likely have passed.169 The legislature instructed the art-
ists’ representatives to reach a compromise on the bill with the ma-
jor record labels, but compromise was never reached and the Cali-
fornia legislature has not revisited the issue.170 
Observers of these movements have made convincing argu-
ments to repeal section 2855(b) in order to grant musicians the 
same protection as other artists in the entertainment field: 
Section 2855(b) permits record labels to take part in 
practices that conflict with the doctrines of uncons-
cionability and involuntary servitude. By allowing 
the labels to sue for breach of long-term recording 
agreements, section 2855(b) assists in the creation 
of unconscionable duration periods and helps force 
the artist into involuntary servitude with the threat 
of damages. Record companies with vast resources 
may continue to press for settlement in important 
cases they fear they may lose to keep these issues 
safe from judicial review. 
Of course, an artist should not be able to just walk away from a 
contractual agreement—it would be disastrous for a company to 
lose the millions it invested in a new artist . . . [but artists] are simp-
ly asking that they be treated like every other creative artist that is 
subject to the Seven Year Statute.171 
Advocates of repeal argue that the elimination of section 
2855(b) would reinstate a system of free agency in the music indus-
try.172 Without a damages provision specifically targeting the music 
                                                                                                                            
168 See, e.g., Philips, Recording Stars, supra note 138 (describing a wave of activism by 
recording artists in the early 2000s: exploring the possibility of a labor union, lobbying 
Congress to look into business practices of major labels, and a Courtney Love lawsuit 
seeking non-enforcement of her contract); Vanhorn, supra note 52. 
169 See Philips, Bill on Free Agency, supra note 151. 
170 Id. 
171 See Gardner, supra note 103, at 756. 
172 Id. 
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industry, recording artists would “enjoy[] the same rights as all 
other citizens,” and “there would be a reasonable opportunity for 
them to receive fair-market compensation for their services.”173 
Further, others argue that repealing the amendment would en-
courage the industry to adapt its practices to reflect new trends and 
technology: without the monetary leverage that section 2855(b)(3) 
provides labels, “[t]he industry’s business model is going to have 
to change . . . [the labels are] going to have to be more judicious in 
signing new artists, cut down on the expensive videos and other 
marketing costs, and they’re going to have to rethink signing way 
too many megastars.”174 Adherents to this argument believe that 
labels will be forced to enter into contracts more carefully, poten-
tially reducing labels’ ability to take chances on the many unprofit-
able artists by relying on their superstars to make up the difference, 
as currently only a very small number of a label’s acts are actually 
profitable.175 Although successful artists would likely view this 
change as positive, label executives warn that it would decrease op-
portunities for new entrants and would harm the industry as a 
whole: “companies would have no incentive to underwrite the 
risky enterprise” in which only a small number of albums actually 
turn a profit.176 
This argument seems outdated in a world where recording art-
ists have an opportunity to gain fans and popularity without the 
assistance (both in expertise and money) of a major label. Although 
                                                                                                                            
173 Cappello & Thielemann, supra note 73, at 19. 
174 Greg Kot, You Say You Want A Revolution, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 24, 2002), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2002-02-24/news/0202240354_1_recording-artists-
coalition-recording-industry-universal-music-group [http://perma.cc/4XVS-T6M7] (quoting 
Michael Nathanson, a music analyst). 
175 See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 103, at 734 (“Because of the high failure rate of 
released albums, record companies absorb great losses on most albums . . . .”) (citing 
Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on the Entertainment Industry, 2001 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Cal. 2001) (testimony of Ann Chaitovitz, Director of Sound Recordings, 
AFTRA)); Note, supra note 60, at 2645 (“[T]here is a greater than ninety-percent chance 
that any given artist’s release will be unprofitable.”); Toomey, supra note 52 (“[T]he 
music industry in America is fundamentally broken. In 1999, less than 1 percent of the 
total number of albums released sold more than 10,000 copies.”) (citing David Segal, 
They Sell Songs the Whole World Sings: Mass Merchants Offer Convenience, Less Choice, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 2001), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-419720.html 
[http://perma.cc/7W8G-NLXU]). 
176 See Philips, Recording Stars, supra note 138. 
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it may be true that labels in the past “ha[d] to invest $750,000 to 
$1 million per act” before they knew if they would make a profit,177 
there exist other avenues and mediums now that may assist labels 
in determining whether an act will be successful before he or she is 
signed. As younger fan bases access music more and more easily 
over the Internet, channels like YouTube have become more and 
more important. Take, for example, pop star Justin Bieber: al-
though recent antics may make him easier to discount, he has sold 
millions of records178 and is the epitome of a new age star, backed 
by social media and tech-savvy fans.179 Yet, he didn’t go to open 
mic nights or send tapes to labels, hoping to be found; at twelve, 
Bieber began uploading videos of himself on YouTube, and as they 
became more and more popular on the site, industry professionals 
sought him out—not the other way around.180 As hopeful produc-
ers engaged in a bidding war to win him to their labels,181 Bieber’s 
establishment on social media sites like YouTube gave him credi-
bility that made investing in him a less risky endeavor. 
Additionally, artists have other opportunities today through al-
ternate career paths. Lennon and Maisy Stella, now sixteen and 
twelve years old, respectively, are Canadian sisters who also gained 
fame on YouTube.182 After posting a cover of Robyn’s “Call Your 
Girlfriend” in May 2012, the video “went viral,” and that fall, the 
                                                                                                                            
177 Id. 
178 Glenn Peoples, Justin Bieber’s “Baby” With New Steaming Data Beats Out Elton 
John For RIAA’s Top Platinum Single of All Time, BILLBOARD (May 17, 2013, 11:26 AM), 
http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/digital-and-mobile/1562681/justin-biebers-
baby-with-new-streaming-data-beats-out [http://perma.cc/84QC-CJXX]. 
179 As of October 2015, Justin Bieber has over 68 million followers on Twitter, see Justin 
Bieber (@JustinBieber), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/justinbieber [http://perma.cc/ 
NLP8-WRDS] (last visited Nov. 1, 2015), and over 40 million followers on Instagram, see 
Justin Bieber (@JustinBieber), INSTAGRAM, https://instagram.com/justinbieber 
[http://perma.cc/3KRQ-5ZCL] (last visited Nov. 1, 2015). His fans are called 
“Beliebers” and often mobilize on social media cites, namely Twitter, to support and 
promote him. See NEVER SAY NEVER (Paramount Pictures 2011). 
180 Desiree Adib, Pop Star Justin Bieber Is on the Brink of Superstardom, ABCNEWS 
(Nov. 14, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Weekend/teen-pop-star-justin-bieber-
discovered-youtube/story?id=9068403 [http://perma.cc/8R9C-BTQ8]. 
181 Id. 
182 See Lesley Goldberg, “Nashville” First Look: Meet the Stella Sisters (Exclusive Photos), 
HOLLYWOOD REP. (Sept. 12, 2011, 1:15 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/live-
feed/nashville-lennon-maisy-stella-connie-britton-369879 [http://perma.cc/X4SW-25TZ]. 
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girls began to appear on the ABC drama “Nashville.”183 Although 
it may be easy to assume the video landed the girls the role, they 
were actually cast before the video was posted; because they are 
Canadian, they needed to establish a portfolio for their visas, and 
the millions of views on the video allowed them to earn these visas 
more easily.184 Despite their growing fan base, the girls are current-
ly unsigned by a label and are releasing music through the show’s 
soundtracks.185 
The Stella sisters join a number of actors and actresses starring 
in musical shows and movies, whose recording careers launch 
through soundtrack and compilation records, rather than through 
typical recording contracts.186 Thus, with more extensive oppor-
tunities to predict the potential success of a musician’s career in a 
digitally dominated marketplace with evidence of that performer’s 
pre-label success on sites like YouTube, Vevo, SoundCloud, and 
others, labels can continue to take “risks” on new artists, as these 
risks can be more sophistically calculated.187 Still, even if acquiring, 
                                                                                                                            
183 See Jaimie Etkin, Lennon And Maisy Stella Talk “Nashville,” Connie Britton, Sisterly 
Bonding, Fashion And More, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 19, 2012, 9:15 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/17/lennon-and-maisy-stella-
nashville_n_1975186.html [http://perma.cc/MW4N-4JCZ]. 
184 “Nashville” Duo Lennon & Maisy Talk TV Stardom, Writing New Music And Trying to 




185 See Nashville Soundtrack, BIG MACH. LABEL GRP., http://www.bigmachine 
labelgroup.com/artist/nashville-soundtrack [http://perma.cc/J4ME-XL4C] (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2015). 
186 See, e.g., Keith Caulfield, Rewinding the Charts: In 2006, “High School Musical” 
Started Something New, BILLBOARD (Mar. 11, 2015, 10:05 AM), 
http://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/chart-beat/6494765/rewinding-the-charts-
in-2006-high-school-musical-started [http://perma.cc/32MB-3JBE] (discussing the 
effect of 2006 Disney Channel movie High School Musical on the career of its star, and on 
subsequent music-centric shows, like Disney’s Hannah Montana and Fox’s Glee); Ed 
Masley, For “Glee” fans, the Journey is Worth it for Launch of Live Tour, USATODAY 
(May 17, 2010, 10:24 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/life/music/reviews/2010-
05-16-gleeonline17_N.htm [http://perma.cc/3SDM-LQ3E] (reviewing the launch of a 
national concert tour of Glee, featuring the cast of the show). 
187 Despite the problematic effects of streaming on album sales and royalty collection, 
see supra note 162, the advent of streaming services, Internet radio, and social media has 
created additional avenues through which an artist may reach consumers. See Data to 
Date, supra note 162. Companies like Next Big Thing analyze “music analytics” by 
308 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXVI:275 
 
marketing, producing, and promoting music of new talent remains 
as difficult as it ever was, the law should not protect the label at the 
expense of the artist. Labels have always employed strategies for 
predicting a new artist’s potential success, and plenty of hopeful 
musicians go unsigned each year. Therefore, the legislature should 
not consider it a detriment that labels may take fewer risks on un-
known musicians, but rather, as a positive of repeal: if labels are not 
guaranteed to keep their best-selling artists for an indefinite length 
of time, they will be forced to scout new talent more wisely. As 
Courtney Love pointed out in 2001: “How do the guys running 
these labels get away with a 95% failure rate that would be totally 
unacceptable in any other type of business?”188 
Although there may be an element of unjust enrichment for art-
ists who gain popularity and financial success with a label and then 
leave it, no other industry’s employers are protected from this pos-
sibility. If they were, every employer that hires an entry-level em-
ployee who eventually achieves promotion within the company, as 
a result of his or her job training and experience, could sue the em-
ployee for damages for the “investment” made in training, or “fu-
ture earnings” that employee might generate for the company.189 
                                                                                                                            
tracking an artist’s popularity on social media sites, the number of times an artist’s song 
or video is played on streaming services, and the number of views on an artist’s Wikipedia 
page. Id. The availability of this data represents a major strategic benefit to “music 
makers, labels and marketers looking for data and insights about artists and their fans.” 
See About Next Big Sound, NEXT BIG SOUND, https://www.nextbigsound.com/about 
[http://perma.cc/7YQ6-VV5B] (last visited Nov. 9, 2015). 
188 Philips, Recording Stars, supra note 138. 
189 Consider an entertainment-industry specific example: take an actor or actress who 
becomes famous by working on a television show. The contract might include option 
periods that extend beyond the seven-year timeframe. If the producers of the show were 
able, in the same way as labels in the music industry, to recover damages for any 
“undelivered” seasons, these actors and actresses would likely be forced to continue to 
appear on the show, lest they be sued for the predicted future losses sustained by the 
producers by ending the performer’s contract. In this scenario, it would be incredibly 
difficult to calculate the potential loss to the producers from the star’s absence. Would 
the show decrease in popularity? Could they prove the show’s declining ratings are 
attributable to the star’s absence? What if the show continues for many years, as the NBC 
medical drama E.R. lasted fifteen seasons? See About ER & Cast Bios, NBC, 
http://www.nbc.com/er/about [http://perma.cc/A3GR-ZC2X] (last visited Oct. 30, 
2015). The television industry is an interesting comparison to the music industry, as the 
artists in both enjoy starkly opposite levels of bargaining power. TV stars of popular 
shows have considerable leverage, likely because they are not easily replaceable. In fact, the 
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Rather, labels, like employers in other industries, would need to 
focus on their relationships with their artist-employees to encour-
age them to continue the business relationship. Additionally, artists 
would be free to renegotiate a new contract with their label as the 
contract neared the end of the term, but the label would need to 
pay according to their value in the market.190 The production of 
each album remains a financial risk, even for well-established musi-
cians,191 and labels who develop positive and personal relationships 
and seek to renegotiate their star musicians’ contracts would al-
most certainly have an advantage in the free market over other la-
bels. 
Without section 2855(b), artists would be free to leave and 
work with others after the term is over, and labels would be forced 
to create contracts that can feasibly be produced in the time frame. 
Further, even without section 2855(b), the law would continue to 
protect the labels in the event an artist does not fulfill, or reasona-
bly attempt to fulfill, his or her obligations: if an artist is required to 
deliver three albums on a schedule set by the contract, but fails to 
do so within seven years at his or her own fault, the label retains the 
ability to sue the artist on a bad faith breach of contract claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Repealing section 2855(b) is the most effective way to balance 
in bargaining power in music industry contract negotiations, and to 
restore the rights under section 2855(a), the Seven Year Rule, that 
                                                                                                                            
stars of the ABC comedy Modern Family had so much bargaining power, they incorrectly 
claimed their contracts were illegal and void simply because their contracts contained 
option periods that could have extended their terms beyond seven years. See RAMER, supra 
note 19, at 4. Still, perhaps seeking to avoid prolonged legal trouble, the network 
renegotiated these contracts within days and the lawsuit was withdrawn. Id. Of course, 
the fact that a contract could last beyond seven years does not make the contract illegal 
and void; rather, after the seven years has ended, a party is permitted to seek non-
enforcement of it. See id. at 3–4; see also CAL. LAB. CODE § 2855(a) (2014). 
190 See Cappello & Thielemann, supra note 73, at 19. But see RAMER, supra note 19, at 4–
5 (noting that a renegotiation contract, beyond the seven year mark, should have a “lag” 
day in which the artist is technically not under contract at all, as that day would restart the 
seven year stopwatch and would allow the artist the freedom to sign elsewhere if he or she 
so chooses). 
191 See supra note 161 and accompanying example of Alanis Morissette’s album sales. 
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musicians lost in 1987. It is unlikely, however, that artists will see 
section 2855(b) repealed without strong collective action. Lobbying 
the California legislature as a unit and testifying on exact contract 
terms, compensation, and industry practices can present a convinc-
ing argument for repeal. Without unity, however, artists will see 
these actions dismantled, as they did in 2002.192 Thus, artists may 
be better served by focusing efforts first on the establishment of a 
union, guild, or other professional association, allowing artists to 
bargain collectively and more effectively against unfair statutes that 
enable unconscionable contract enforcement. 
                                                                                                                            
192 See supra text accompanying note 169. 
